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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-
801(8)(a); 63G-4-403(l); and 78A-4-103(2)(a). Petitioners have exhausted all 
administrative remedies available at law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-
401. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE ONE 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission 
committed reversible clear error when impermissibly inferring that Respondent 
wanted the coccyx surgery (and prematurely ordering temporary disability 
benefits when Respondent is refusing to undergo the coccyx surgery upon 
request). 
Standard of review: The application of law by the Labor Commission 
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor 
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App 1998). 
ISSUE TWO 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order should be vacated because the ALJ's decision is not 
supported by sufficient evidence and the findings of fact are inadequate. 
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Standard of Review: The determination of the Labor Commission 
should be set aside as an abuse of discretion if it "exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Hymas v. Labor Comm 'n, 996 P.2d 1072 
(Utah App. 2008). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, RULES, OR 
CONSTITUTIONS 
ISSUE ONE 
Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-403(4)(d); 
UtahR.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6); 
ISSUE TWO 
Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-403(4)(d); 
UtahR.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6); 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 16, 2007, Respondent filed an Application for Hearing on the 
issues of medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total 
disability compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and 
interest. (R. 1). Petitioners filed their answer on September 21, 2007. (R. 13-
19). On June 5, 2008, a hearing was held on Respondent's application for 
hearing. 
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• After the hearing, r-c ^: requested a medical panel which provided 
opinions on how to handle the medical disputes on ihe ease The medical panel 
found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work related, bi it found 
medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe, and coccyx 
conditions I he medical panel further found that the bilateral ankles, feet, and 
great right lot1 v\ ere medically stable as of February 17, 2007. The medical 
panel also stated as follows: 
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by Dr. 
Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum Medical 
Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until approximately 6 
months after the contemplative coccygectomy is undertaken. If Ms. 
Hartley does not wish to undergo that surgical procedure, it is my 
opinion that she would have reached a point of medical stability ... one 
year after her date of injury, that being on and/or about 07/17/07" (R. 
75). 
On February 26, 2009, Administrative Law hiu^ Lorrie Lima issued her 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ordei I R 77 87 ). The Al J ordered 
Petitioners to pay TPD benefits from July 17, 2006 to August 2f>. 20iib and 
TTD benefits from August 27, 2006 to October 23, 2006 (during the periods 
when claimant had reduced hours or between jobs). (R. 85). The ALJ also 
inferred that Respondent had elected the coccyx surgery, as evidenced by her 
pursuit of litigation and medical treatment, and therefore she was not at MMI. 
(R. 84-85). 
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Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission 
on March 305 2009. (R. 88-90). The Labor Commission issued its order on 
April 26, 2011 and denied Petitioners' argument that any award of TTD 
benefits was premature and sua sponte (and without support) may have 
potentially ordered additional benefits to be paid in the interim. Specifically, 
the Labor Commission generally indicated that Respondent was entitled to 
"temporary disability compensation until she reaches medical stability after the 
surgery." (R. 93-96). The ALJ had not provided such an award in her Order 
probably due to the fact that there was uncertainty as to whether the petitioner 
would undergo the coccyx surgery. 
Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 25, 2011, for review, of the entire Order of the Commission. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Respondent alleged an injury to her right foot, knees, hip, thighs, chest, 
tailbone, low and mid back and across her arms as a result of an alleged 
industrial injury on July 17, 2006. (R. 78). This matter then came before the 
Labor Commission at a hearing on June 5, 2008. The ALJ referred the medical 
aspects of this case to a medical panel, chaired by Dr. Alan Goldman, with the 
medical panel report issued on November 21, 2008. (R. 70-76). The ALJ issued 
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her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on February 26, 2009. (R. 
77-87). 
The ALJ found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work 
related, but found medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe, 
and coccyx conditions. (R. 83-84). The ALJ further found that the bilateral 
ankles, feet, and great right toe were medically stable as of February 17, 2007 in 
accordance with the findings of the medical panel. (R. 84). 
The ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings that further medical 
treatment, including a coccygectomy, may be reasonable and necessary to treat 
this industrial injury. Specifically, the medical panel had found as follows with 
regard to this issue: 
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by 
Dr. Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum 
Medical Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until 
approximately 6 months after the contemplative coccygectomy is 
undertaken. If Ms. Hartley does not wish to undergo that 
surgical procedure, it is my opinion that she would have reached 
a point of medical stability ... one year after her date of injury, 
that being on and/or about 07/17/07r (R. 75). 
The ALJ ultimately inferred that Respondents has sought to have the 
coccygectomy by generally pursuing medical treatment and litigation and, 
therefore, was not at MMI. (R. 84). Accordingly, the ALJ found that 
Respondent is not at MMI and ordered the Petitioners to pay ongoing temporary 
disability payments from February 24, 2007 to October 29, 2007. (R. 85). The 
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ALJ, however, did not order the ongoing payment of TTD benefits probably in 
part because Respondent had not formally agreed to proceed with the 
coccygectomy. 
The Commission agreed with the ALJ and determined that the 
coccygectomy was necessary to treat the work injury and, therefore, 
Respondent was entitled to benefits even though her condition was stable with 
regard to everything but the coccyx surgery in July, 2007. (R. 94-95). The 
Labor Commission agreed with the ALJ and sua sponte may have ordered 
additional temporary disability benefits to be paid in the interim. Specifically, 
the Labor Commission generally ordered respondents to pay for ongoing TTD 
benefits (which the ALJ did NOT order) without any explanation on this issue. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order and the Utah Labor Commission's Order should be vacated because 
the decisions are not supported by sufficient evidence and the findings of fact 
are inadequate. The ALJ committed reversible clear error when she inferred 
that Respondent wanted the coccyx surgery and prematurely ordered benefits 
when Respondent had not yet undergone the surgery or agreed to undergo the 
surgery. Further, the Labor Commission failed to address the fact that 
Respondent has still not specifically agreed to proceed with the surgery upon 
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request. Moreover, the Labor Commission indicated that Petitioners need to 
pay ongoing temporary disability benefits (when the ALJ refused to order 
ongoing benefits) even though Respondent still has not agreed to proceed with 
the surgery. 
ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error where 
she prematurely ordered benefits when Respondent had not yet undergone the 
surgery. Respondent's condition was medically stable as of July 17, 2007 as to 
all conditions but the coccyx surgery. As a result of this stabilization, 
Respondent is not entitled to additional temporary disability benefits until she 
decides to pursue surgery. If and when she decides to pursue surgery, she may 
become entitled to additional compensation benefits. However, in the interim, 
Respondent should not be awarded additional benefits because she decided to 
delay pursuit of surgery. Such a determination by this Court would allow 
Respondent to wait and delay treatment simply to gain additional benefits. 
Once a determination of stabilization has been made, temporary benefits should 
cease and only be reopened once an event has occurred which alters this 
determination of stabilization. 
This case came before the Labor Commission at a hearing on June 5, 
2008. The ALJ referred the medical aspects of this case to a medical panel, 
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chaired by Dr. Alan Goldman, with the medical panel report issued on 
November 21, 2008. The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order on February 26, 2009. 
The ALJ found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work 
related, but found medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe, 
and coccyx conditions. The ALJ further found that the bilateral ankles, feet, 
and great right toe were medically stable as of February 17, 2007 in accordance 
with the findings of the medical panel. 
The ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings that further medical 
treatment, including a coccygectomy, may be reasonable and necessary to treat 
this industrial injury. Specifically, the medical panel found as follows: 
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by Dr. 
Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum Medical 
Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until approximately 6 
months after the contemplative coccygectomy is undertaken. If Ms. 
Hartley does not wish to undergo that surgical procedure, it is my 
opinion that she would have reached a point of medical stability ... one 
year after her date of injury, that being on and/or about 07/17/07." 
The ALJ implicitly inferred that Respondent had, by generally pursing 
the claim and medical treatment, sought to have the coccygectomy and, 
therefore, was not at MMI. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Respondent is not 
at MMI and ordered respondents to pay ongoing temporary disability payments 
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from February 24, 2007 to October 29, 2007, the day she began work with a 
new employer. 
Petitioners argue that the ALJ's order regarding benefits paid after July 
17, 2007 is premature. Specifically, Respondent has not yet undergone the 
surgery so it is premature to assume that the surgery will take place. If 
Respondent fails to proceed with the surgery, she was found to have reached 
MMI by July 17, 2007. Any benefits awarded by the ALJ after this date, 
therefore, is premature until the surgery takes place. Specifically, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has held that temporary disability benefits are intended to 
provide an employee with benefits during the time she recuperates from a work 
injury and should terminate at stabilization. Griffith v. Industrial Comm 'n of 
Utah 754 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Stabilization has been defined 
as a factual question to be determined by the medical evidence in the record. 
M a t 984. 
Respondent was found to be at MMI on July 17, 2007 until the surgery 
takes place. If she decides to pursue surgery, then her temporary disability 
benefits may resume. However, in the interim she should not be awarded 
benefits since her work related injury was found to have stabilized. 
The ALJ impermissibly presumed or inferred that Respondent wanted the 
coccyx surgery. In fact, she has refused to proceed with the surgery despite 
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inquiries from respondents. This is the problem with the ALJ's order. She 
presumed that the Respondent may want surgery based on filing the claim and 
generally pursuing medical treatment instead of direct evidence on the issue. 
This error has been potentially compounded by the Labor Commission. 
Even though the ALJ did not order ongoing TTD benefits (there was an end 
date provided), the Labor Commission made a open ended statement that 
Respondent is entitled to "temporary disability compensation until she reaches 
medical stability after the surgery." If this is somehow considered an additional 
finding, it expands the benefits awarded by the ALJ (as the ALJ only awarded 
closed ended benefits). This new potential finding by the Labor Commission 
constitutes an error of law. 
Petitioners contend that petitioner was at MMI as of July 17, 2007, and 
should not have been found eligible for temporary disability benefits after that 
date. Petitioners further argue that any alleged increase in benefits awarded by 
the Labor Commission is impermissible. The Labor Commission should not be 
permitted to sua sponte order an increase in benefits to be paid in the interim 
(and it is not clear that this is what the Labor Commission did anyway). If the 
Labor Commission believed that additional benefits should have been awarded, 
the matter should have been remanded to the ALJ or there should have been 
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direct evidence that the petitioner will proceed with the surgery. Again, 
Respondent has refused to proceed with the surgery and instead is trying to 
obtain additional temporary disability benefits (that were not ordered by the 
ALJ) even though she has refused to proceed with the possible surgery. 
Petitioners argue that this matter should be remanded so the ALJ can 
amend her findings, conclusions, and orders to find Respondent at MMI as of 
July 17, 2007 and, if petitioner elects to undergo the coccygectomy, Respondent 
would be entitled to further temporary disability benefits only after the surgery 
takes place. The other option would be to affirm the ALJ's order with the end 
date for TTD already provided (without including the additional time frame of 
temporary disability benefits potentially discussed by the Labor Commission) 
and then Respondent can refile for hearing if she actually wants to the coccyx 
surgery. 
In any case, it is unacceptable that the Labor Commission has discussed 
the possibility of ongoing temporary disability benefits which were not awarded 
by the ALJ (especially when the Respondent has not agreed to proceed with the 
disputed surgery). Respondent did not appeal the ALJ's order so.it would be 
impermissible to consider a possible increase in the award provided by the ALJ. 
In addition, the Labor Commission only affirmed the ALJ's Order so there 
should not be any additional benefits awarded. If Respondent wants additional 
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temporary disability benefits that were not awarded by the ALJ, she would need 
to refile for hearing. 
Petitioners also allege that the order is generally not supported by 
applicable law or substantial evidence. Petitioners argue that the order must be 
overturned with regard to the award of any additional temporary disability 
benefits and medical benefits on this case. 
Petitioners respectfully request that this matter be remanded and the ALJ 
be instructed to enter a Supplementary Order amending her prior Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions or Law, and Order to find petitioner at MMI as of July 17, 
2007, strike the order of temporary disability benefits from July 17, 2007 to 
October 29, 2007, and order farther temporary disability benefits only if 
petitioner actually undergoes the coccygectomy. Petitioners also request that 
the order be clarified in that the Labor Commission should not have awarded 
any additional temporary disability benefits or medical benefits. Ultimately, 
either the matter needs to be remanded or ongoing temporary disability benefits 
should not be awarded until Respondent agrees to proceed with the surgery. 
Petitioners, therefore, ask for one of the two following remedies to 
address this issue: 
* The matter should be remanded to the ALJ so that she will 
reach a supported factual determination on whether Respondent 
wants the coccyx surgery instead of impermissibly inferring this 
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fact (with a full explanation of any ongoing temporary disability 
benefits that are due); or, at a minimum 
* The Labor Commission's appellate review should not be accepted 
as an expansion of temporary disability benefits to Respondent 
which were not awarded by the ALJ — the Labor Commission's 
Order should only be viewed as affirming the award of benefits 
provided by the ALJ instead of expanding any benefits (as 
Respondent did not even appeal the Order and the potential 
expansion of benefits is not clear in the Order or justified due to 
the impermissible inference regarding the surgery); 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the final order of the Labor Commission, below as an abuse of discretion, not 
legally supported, arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial 
evidence, and remand for such other proceedings as necessary. 
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Dated this y day of April, 2012. 
THOMAS POLLART & MILLER LLC 
Brad J. MillW^tf4 ?J8 
Attorneysyfor Respondents Waste 
Mangement andl Idemnity 
Insurance of North America 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, orders, jury instructions. 
None. 
B. Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as 
contracts or other documents. 
None. 
C. Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv): "The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: the agency 
action is: (i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; (ii) contrary 
to a rule of the agency; (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitraiy or capricious." 
Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(1): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;. . . ." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(6): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): "(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: . . . (g ) the agency 
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is 
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; . . . ." 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction: "(1) The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who 
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.,? 
o 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the attached PETITIONERS' BRIEF was served upon 
the party(ies) listed below by mailing it by first class mail, personal deliver, or 
fax to the following address(es): 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellate Clerks' Office 
450 South State, Fifth Floor 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-023 
Sent Via: 
Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Personal Delivery 
Fax #801-578-3999 
Michael Belnap, Esq. 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Sent Via: 
Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Personal Delivery 
Fax #801-399-4033 
Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Sent Via: 
Mail (postage prepaid) 
Personal Delivery 
X Fax #801-328-9019 
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